Press "Enter" to skip to content

Alexander Dugin: The Eurasian Occultist

“To be human is to be dangerous” – Alexander Dugin

There are many misconceptions about the Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin and his Eurasianism that resembles pagan gnostic occultism more so than Classical Eurasianism. Clarification between Russian Eurasianism and Alexander Dugin’s advocacy needs to be further distinguished to avoid deceitful manipulation.

The terrorism committed by the Christchurch shooter Brenton Tarrant formulated his ideology on the work of Generation Identity and the New Right. Generation Identity is an Alt-Right Pan-European pagan patriotic movement with political goals of Stop the Islamization of Europe, Oppose Globalization and Stop and Reverse the Great Replacement. Their activism involves remigration where migrants should be forced to return back to their countries of origin. Their Ideology is a combination of anti-liberal philosophers including Alain de Benoist, Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt, Julius Evola, Guillaume Faye, Oswald Spengler, Martin Heidegger and Alexander Dugin. Generation Identity utilises social media, banners, posters and merchandise to promote their narratives to recruit and engage with the public. Their ideology is messaged and marketed as an alternative to mainstream politics amongst the decay and crisis of European society, culture and national identity (Richards 2019). Only a complete Pan-European national cultural revival can save European civilisation from immigration, globalisation and liberalism. Historical revisionism and conspiracy are used to reinforce their ideological narratives to mobilise followers to engage in activism and political violence. The community is mostly in Europe with only a few followers online and even fewer members in official chapters in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, UK, US and Ireland. However, given their rise to prominence within Europe, affiliations with other radical groups and the connection to the Christchurch terrorist attack. It has highlighted some obvious problems with the strategies of counter terrorism and the establishment of the European Union.

Generation Identity emerged in 2012 in France and went on to form different chapters across Europe. Its French New Right origins date back to 2002 advocating the rights for European ethnocultural groups. The movement is a manifestation of the metapolitical struggle and culture war of the continuation of the French New Right Nouvelle Droite that emerged in 1968 (Richards 2019; Bar-On 2001; 2008). Generation Identity’s activism has involved protests, marches, posters, banners and targeting refugees promoting tougher immigration laws and ethnopluralism (Nissen 2020). The alt-right group is one of the most recent incarnations of the radical right’s long-standing project against liberalism, multiculturalism and immigration. Its right wing Gramscianism of a Pan-European ethnic cultural hegemony is to replace the liberal EU establishment. The movement is the rebranding of radical ethnic nationalists into a more revolutionary transnational internationalists representing a collectivist homogenesis historical culture. It’s to move the radical right traditionally away from certain strands of Nazism and nationalism into a renewed universal ethnic cultural identity and ideology. Identity and ideology play an important role within the movement to mobilise political activism against the liberal democratic establishment (liberal elites) and the left-wing conspiracy against their European white ethnic demographic (European white genocide, great replacement, etc.) Nouvelle Droite paved the way for Generation Identity’s ideology where Alain de Benoist’s ideology got rid of two dogmas of fascism which are racism and rejection of democracy. Benoist replaced racism with ethnopluralism and promoted organic democracy (direct democracy) based on ethnic homogeneity and the Athenian polis model (Schelkshorn 2018). The objectives are to wage a cultural war by civil society against the media and the liberal left by supporting worldwide ethnopluralism against homogenization by the state, capitalism, EU, international organisations and liberal multiculturalism. Limit if not stop immigration entirely within the context of non-racist even anti-racist on the bases of belonging to different cultures (Bar-On 2021). Generation Identity has adopted most of Guillaume Faye’s work to construct their ideology with his political vision of biologistic instead of Benoist’s anti-immigration ethnocultural biopolitics. In Generation identity: A Declaration of War Against the 68ers Markus Willinger cites Faye saying “A people’s identity is what makes it incomparable and irreplaceable” also “identity’s basis is biological without it the realms of culture and civilization are unsustainable”. He has also summarised Faye’s main arguments stating “The agents of the system for killing peoples … would like to break the chain of our heritage: we’re here to fix its links” (Bar-On 2021). Willinger’s other book A Europe of Nations and Michael Levin’s Why Race Matters have provided a critical perspective on religion, politics, economics, ecology, globalization, liberalism and immigration. All of which has contributed to the ideological and political characteristics and behaviour of Generation Identity and its members.

Alexander Dugin has contributed significantly towards the New Right with a very pro-fascist pro-imperialist radical extremist transnational ultrarational pagan philosophical framework. Dugin has blended different disciplines, theoretical concepts, spiritualities, philosophies and metaphysics together which are incompatible with each other to develop a nuance political philosophy called the Fourth Political Theory (Upton 2018). Dugin takes this even further placing this philosophical ideology into the geopolitical school of thought from Karl Haushofer, Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman with mysticism, Aryanism, conspirology, fascism and Russian Eurasianism (Kipp 2002; Backman 2020; Tydlitatova; Sedgwick 2012). Dugin is no stranger to radical extremism, controversy and nefarious intensions given his history with Pamyat, Eduard Limonov’s National Bolsheviks and his own International Eurasianist Movement. Dugin called for Russians to retaliate against Ukrainians during the 2014 Ukraine crisis (Tolstoy & McCaffray 2015). Dugin supported Russian troops intervention into the armed conflict between Georgia and the separatist forces of South Ossetia. He widely publicised throughout the Russian media ‘Those, who do not second the “Tanks to Tbilisi!”, are not Russians. “Tanks to Tbilisi” that’s what should be written on every Russian’s forehead.’ (Shekhovtsov 2009). Dugin has praised the Soviet-era KGB for preparing his Eurasianist project by investigating the people of Eurasia. To create an Asiatic strategic bloc under Moscow’s control. Dugin has suggested that Russia needs a (oprichnina) new secret police of Ivan the Terrible and that terrorizing people is actually beneficial for them (Clowes 2011). Dugin has also utilised occultism particularly from Arturo Reghini (Dugin 1995) (Julius Evola & Arturo Reghini had a falling out over the plagiarism of the publication Pagan Imperialism (Drake 1988)), Aleister Crowley and his time with Soviet underground Iuzhinskii Circle to morph this with religious messianic eschatology which he also puts into a geopolitical concept for a Eurasian spiritual civilisation (Laruelle 2015; Upton 2018; Noordenbos 2011; 2016; Hakl 2012). Dugin views conspiracy as a fun post-modern science where it is a continuation of medieval myths of dark forces and devil’s intrigues that are used outside the religious context. Dugin explains conspiracy as an admirable chaos and fascinating delirium to analyse conspiracy as a sociological and cultural phenomenon of post-modernity. In Dugin’s book Conspirology he outlines an eschatological occult metaphysical war including a mason plot, Jewish plot, bankers plot, Bolshevik plot, mundialisation plot and secularization plot. Dugin’s method is based on inverted distorted metaphysical dogmas and inborn psycho-mental directions of psycho-genetic factors between different races and cultures. Different races and cultures represent different transcendent principles and ideologies. However, Dugin doesn’t really explain how does this in its particular context is significant and substantial towards history, culture and politics (Shnirelman 2019). The New Right’s mission is to make the Old Right the New Revolutionary Left utilising the thinkers of the German Conservative Revolution and pan-cultural nationalism (Luks 2009; Bar-On 2009). The viability of the New Right is to form nuance alliances and networks with as many different political, cultural, religious and ethnic demographics against the liberal hegemonic order (Dugin 2014). Beniost and Dugin meet in 1990 and have been collaborating many times since then. Dugin and Alexander Prokhanov were fascinated by Benoist and Nouvelle Droite whom they regarded as the Western equivalent to the Russian pochvenniki (Russian New Right). Dugin, Beniost and Prokhanov were instrumental in forming the Red-Brown alliance in Russia between communists and nationalists in 1990s (Bar-On 2013; Laqueur 1993; Versluis 2014; Piveronus Jr. 2009). Both Peunova (2008) and Sokolov (2009) have distinguished that Alexander Panarin and Alexander Dugin’s new Eurasianism (Neo-Eurasianism) is a variant and continuation of the European New Right. A manifestation of the intellectual transnational nature of the extreme radical right and a form of Europeanization of Russian ultra-nationalism. As Dugin put it in an interview:

“If the European New Right chooses us (Russians), that means it chooses the barbarian element, and therefore it must choose our methods of action,” (Dugin) says. He notes that the New World Order will not come about by means of “aging gentlemen meeting in seminars.” He advises the following: “You must take a knife, put on a mask, go out of the house in the evening and kill at least one Yank.” He adds, “I do not know whether any of the New Right activists have ever been under artillery siege, but our people do not only go to meetings or fight at the barricades, they also go to real wars, for instance to the Dniestr district (Moldova), or to Yugoslavia…. The New Right is only a project, and we are its architects. The future is truly ours.” Interview with Dugin 1998 (Clowes 2011)

Dugin views the ideology of fascism as a revolutionary process as he outlined:

Fascism this is nationalism yet not any nationalism, but revolutionary, rebellious, romantic, idealistic (form of nationalism) appealing to a great myth and transcendental idea, trying to put into practice the impossible dream, to give birth to a society of the hero and superhuman, to change and transform the world. (Shekhovtsov 2008)

Dugin has advised his Eurasian followers to participate in the local intifada (The Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation) as he said:

“The conflict in Israel is incredibly beneficial to us. And the great powers are in no hurry. It’s been a long time since we saw Hezbollah, so we went. And you shouldn’t just hurt the Arabs. The contradiction between the United States and Israel that has emerged is a gift of fate. Now only more blood. And everyone should participate in everything. Even in Voronezh or Tambov, you should take part each in its own way in the local intifada, intifada everywhere. Zionist jihad. The children are sleeping.” (Dugin 2000; Arctogea)

Dugin has expressed that Anders Behring Breivik’s terrorist attack in Norway was just a symptom of European decay and welcomes more Breiviks. As he said:

“The end is coming to Europe…. Let there be multiculturalism, Freemasonry, gay pride and Breiviks. Let all this European filth destroy itself…. The more Breiviks… the better.” (Enstad 2017)

In Brenton Tarrant’s manifesto The Great Replacement: Towards a New Society, We March Ever Forwards he credits Anders Breivik as a source of inspiration and insight on white genocide. White genocide is the result of declining European fertility (declining birth rates) and mass immigration of non-Europeans replacing Europeans. The ethnic and cultural replacement of the European people is white genocide where revolutionary action is necessary to stop the extinction of Europeans and European civilisation. Tarrant reminisces that his extremist realisation occurred in France researching the First World War battlefields where Europeans were fighting against the non-European invaders. After witnessing the French presidential election between Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron he became convinced that there was no political solution. Only a violent racial revolution will make whites aware of the historical development of their own white genocide. Violent action and revenge must be taken against Muslims (Islamic invaders) for invading Europe and enslaving and killing Europeans throughout history (Moses 2019). Before the massacre of fifty-one people in Christchurch, New Zealand Tarrant donated money to Generation Identity. Martin Sellner leader of the Austrian chapter and co-founder of Generation Identity had a lengthy email exchange with Tarrant and invited Tarrant to meet him. After Tarrant’s terrorist attack police raids were conducted on Sellner and Generation Identity on the suspicion that Sellner was forming a terrorist organisation with Tarrant. Political steps were made to ban Generation Identity in Austria, France, UK and Germany. But there are still Generation Identity chapters and groups within Europe (Richards 2019). Sellner has moved away from Pan-Europeanism somewhat towards a strategy for European secessionism (Sellner 2021). Tarrant’s terrorist attack has gone on to inspire Patrick Crusius (El Paso Shooter) and Philip Manshaus (Baerum mosque shooter). Tarrant’s attack has had an overall influential impact on the far-right community online coined the ‘Tarrant effect’ (Baele, Brace & Coan 2020). Olavo de Carvalho a controversial Brazilian philosopher has accused Dugin of being an ostensible preacher of war and genocide. As well as performing magic tricks to make conspiracy theories look like respectable historical hypothesises. After Tarrant’s terrorist attack Carvalho made the observation that Tarrant wasn’t a far-right extremist but an Eurasianist given Eurasianism revolutionary left-wing characteristics. Carvalho is accurate in a certain context given the history of left-wing Eurasianism and its revolutionary decolonisation (Shlapentokh 1997; Smirnov 2019; Smirnov 2020). Tarrant in his manifesto refers to Donald Trump as a symbol of renewed white identity and common purpose. Dugin has even said this in his own way during a Chinese interview with (China Global Television Network) CGTN describing that Trump in a way is Eurasianist. Of course, this is referring to that a certain identity represents the collective of a heritage and image of a particular race, cultural, civilisation and ideology. Dugin is an advocate of the doctrine Katechon where a people, nation and civilisation is not sovereign without their own unique authentic ideology (Logos) and values (Engstrom 2014; Kushnir 2019; Prozorov 2012; Bell & du Plessis 2020; Hell 2009). Dugin is also an advocate of Lev Gumilyov’s ethnogenesis (passionary) the science of ethnic cultural cyclical revival and decline with his own ethnosociology (Dugin 1997; 2018; 2019; Panarin & Shnirelman 2001; Bassin & Suny 2016; Shlapentokh 2007). Granted that Carvalho’s comment was a personal jab against Dugin his observation has provided an opportunity for further research on this subject matter. Given the resemblance of the New Right’s literature with that of radical extremist ideology.

The New Right’s survival is only possible with nuance alliances, contacts and networks to rebrand themselves under different projects, initiatives, campaigns and movements. To cope and adjust to the changing political economic landscape of international relations, the international community and the liberal world order. The strategic initiative of the hard-line Russian Eurasianists (Alexander Dugin, Gennady Zyuganov, Yevgeny Primakov, Alexander Prokhanov & Alexander Panarin) has been to create a United States of Eurasia. With forging the Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis and merging the Russian World (Eurasian Orthodox Christianity) with the Islamic World to banish American influence from Eurasia (Piveronus Jr. 2009; Tsygankov 2003; Shlapentokh 2017; Sharpe 2020; Ingram 2001; Curanovic 2010). Dugin has elaborated on many strategic initiatives including the three axis Eurasianist strategy incorporating Moscow-Berlin axis, Moscow-Tokyo axis and Moscow-Tehran axis (Heiser 2014). Dugin was invited by Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Tehran Institute for Strategic Research in 2005 to work towards an alliance between Iran and Russia (Hollwerth, Umland & Uffelmann (2007(2012)); Dreher 2020; Merati 2017; Shlapentokh 2008). Dugin has continuously developed many contacts with many different figures including many from different political, religious, media and academic circles both from the West & East (Michael 2018; Laruelle 2020; Hell & Steinmetz 2017; Teitelbaum 2020). Nouvelle Droite ideologues joined the French Front National in the 1980s to consulate a dynamic political party. Where the New Right’s philosophy and ideology was instrumental in developing the Front National’s ideology and policy (McCulloch 2006; Eltchaninoff 2017). Dugin is working towards merging the Russian World with the Islamic World to find cooperative synchrony between the Eurasian powers and civilisations. If a greater geopolitical counter hegemonic Eurasia and civilisation can’t be realised and achieved then preferably Russia Eurasia should exploit the geopolitical advantageous position it has within Eurasia. Dugin continues to work towards merging political extremism with religious radical fundamentalism particularly morphing radical Eurasian Orthodox Christianity with radical political Islam (Jihadism) to form greater Russian Eurasia (Moscow as the Third Rome). Dugin is perpetuating all radical political and religious extremism with his international Eurasianist movement for a crusade revolutionary suicide against the postmodern world (Shlapentokh 2008; Upton 2018; Garaev 2017; 2021; Arnold 2019; Dugin 1997; 2009; Oskanian 2021). In Dugin’s book Pop-Culture and the Sign of the Times he proclaims Internet Eurasia where Eurasia is not just a political economic geographical concept but also a virtual internet geography. The internet is the weapon for revolutionaries against the hegemonic postmodern liberal world order and its supporters (Clowes 2011). Generation Identity, alt-right, far-right and jihads have utilised the internet to spread their message, engage with the public and their targets and to forged new networks and contacts. Technology such as cryptography, encryption and cryptocurrencies can be utilised to further finance their political violence and terrorism (Ahmed & Pisoiu 2019; Maly 2019; Rauchfleish & Kaiser 2020; Valencia-Garcia 2020; Pokalova 2019; Rudner 2017; Pantucci & Ong 2021; Salami 2018; Warreth 2019; Kfir 2020). Geydar Dzhemal who was a brief friend of Dugin’s who was a part of Pamyat and the Iuzhinskii circle (Black Order of the SS) (Laruelle 2015; Umland 2016; Sibgatullina & Kemper 2017; Arnold 2018) elaborated in an interview on the significance of this alignment:

“For all forces included in this wing, anti-Americanism is a common assembly point. It is these forces that are the rising political stars of the electorate, collecting both “right” and “left” up to a third of the votes in certain regions of Europe. It is these forces, focused on the revival of Europe as an independent traditional civilization, that should become a partner of both Russia and political Islam, at least within the time frame of the current generation”. (Dzhemal 2010 Kontrudar)

Granted there are similar parallels with the radical extremism with that of the far-right and jihadism (ISIS & Al-Qaeda):

Example 1.

Tarrant (invaders)
To take revenge on the invaders for the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by foreign invaders in European lands throughout history.

Thus, before we deal with the fertility rates, we must deal with both the invaders within our lands and the invaders that seek to enter our lands.

Breivik (resistance)

Efforts to consolidate and recruit patriotic resistance fighters in Western European prisons must be a prioritized task the coming decades.

A very important aspect of this non-military effort will involve indirect recruitment work for the armed European resistance movement.

Rumiyah (war)
As the soldiers of the Khilafah continue waging war on the forces of kufr, …

it is a must on every muwahhid to expand the scope of his jihad to include waging war on the kuffars wealth

(Buckingham & Alali 2020; Bar-On 2018)

The notion that far-right extremists and jihads can find any common ground to achieve a mutually beneficial result together is absurd which both Faye and Dzhemal have demonstrated. Faye and Benoist had a falling out over political optics where Benoist criticized Faye for his extremism and Le Pen for his anti-immigrant scapegoating. Faye advocated that Israel could be Europe’s ally against political Islamism and that the main enemy of Europe was Islam more so than liberalism. In an interview Faye explained that:

“For it (Islam) is not simply a religion, but a political doctrine. And this doctrine is imperialist. Twice before in history it has sought to conquer Europe.” (Bar-On 2013)

Dzhemal rejected Dugin’s integration Eurasianist project for Russian Eurasia with absolute disgust expressing that these attempts are emulating the American establishment. Also continuing the imperialist tradition of Russia to commit brutality against Muslims and Islam (Shlapentokh 2008; 2010; 2011 Dzhemal 2006; 2008; 2015). Dzhemal has developed a very dynamic refined version of Jihadism (blending Marxism, Eschatology and Islamism together) advocating Muslims to ignite a global Jihad and Caliphate to dissolve nation-states and the international political economic system entirely (Shlapentokh 2008; Dzhemal 2012; 1997; 2013). Benoist in an interview expressed that Dugin has theorized many esoteric and mystical issues which he all found very foreign (Versluis 2014). Dugin has even expressed his frustration over religious communities, doctrines and tradition:

“Frankly, I hate traditionalists no matter whether they are of domestic or Western origin. They are rabble. Good people do real work or wage wars, even if they have little chance of success. All over the world.” (Shekhovtsov & Umland 2009)

The anarchist, journalist and activist Aleksey Tsvetkov was a member of the Eurasia movement for seven years. He was apart of the National Bolsheviks and wanted to be a part of Eurasianism until Dugin ask him to be involved within government structures. He left describing Eurasianism as a form of political mysticism following the Gnostic scheme of us against them. As he put it:

“This is Dugin’s favourite idea that a cosmic war is being fought. So, all these things fascism, communism, capitalism they are all very relative. Behind them stand some superhuman beings, who are not good or evil. This is a pagan system; it is not morally determined. These are just different forces … and if you find yourself under the influence of one of these forces, you become its soldier either a blind soldier, or a knowing soldier that is, belonging to the minority. This is the Gnostic division of people into those who have heard nothing, those who have heard something …’’ (Fenghi 2020)

Apart from the New Right leaders having clear philosophical ideological differences, both far-right and jihad zealot ideologues are completely incompatible with each other. Far-right extremism is racial national supremacy compared to that of takfiri jihadi universalism (Khalifah for all) (Abdulmajid 2021; Dzhemal 2005). Dzhemal has illustrated that Europe is a dying civilisation and back in 2013 he made the prediction that the EU will cease to exist in 10 years (2023) facing disintegration (Dzhemal 2013; 2016; 2009). There are forecasts that the Covid-19 recession in the global economy and within Western Europe that a renewed escalation of Islamist terrorism could occur in Western Europe around 2026-2027 (Tausch 2021). Plans can certainly be in the works for East Asia bringing radical Hindus, Sikhists, Buddhists, Confusions, Taoists and Shintoists towards political extremism. Also, to bring officials from political, military and security institutions into the international Eurasianist movement (Rangsimaporn 2009; Curanovic 2010). Znamenski’s (2011) book Red Shambhala: Magic, Prophecy and Geopolitics in the Heart of Asia historically shows how Soviet Communists sought geopolitical influence over Mongolia and Tibet by projecting world revolution by utilizing messianic prophecies among Asian tribes. Dugin wants religious cultural communities to embrace political radical extremism to get rid of nation-states and the international system. Replaced with regional civilisational transnationalism constructing a universal spiritual Eurasian civilisation incorporating the West & East the Global South & Global North as one. Simpler to that of Dzhemal’s Jihadism political Islam being the universal spiritual civilisation of the world. However, Dugin’s purpose goes even further than this since this undertaking would cause chaos and according to Dugin’s so-called logic and work globalised liberalisation has caused global chaos and destruction. Why does Dugin then emulate the very thing that he apparently hates? If the overall purpose is to cause chaos and destruction of nation-states and the international system (liberal world order) then by Dugin’s perceived logic he should be a liberal. The reason behind this is simply because Dugin’s sole purpose is to renew the world by destroying the world returning everything and everyone back to God to heaven and hell wherever we may end up. Dugin is an Occultist playing far-out games where no alliance or constructive strategy could ever be formed. The international Eurasianist movement and the New Right can be perceived as a messianic gnostic movement, pagan movement or a geopolitical tool of social engineering (Steinmetz, Knight & McCarthy 2021; Steinmetz 2021). A more accurate evaluation is that the manifestation of Generation Identity, the New Right and the Eurasianist movement is a post-nationalist transnational populist phenomenon (Azmanova & Dakwar 2019). Which is a symptom of the global political economic crisis among nation states and the international community. The crisis of global capitalism, globalisation and geopolitics has created fierce inequality and division that has resulted in nations and citizens consolidating their resources and efforts towards conflict and war (Paul 2020). Psychiatrist, Robert Simon in his book Bad Men Do What Good Men Dream explains that to believe that evil doesn’t exist in oneself is fictitious and is the main driver that enables prejudice and discrimination on a large scale resulting in terrorism, war and genocide (Paul 2021). No doubt that the contradictions and inconsistencies of the New Right has been its downfall. However, attempts can still be made by radical extremists to commit political violence and terrorism utilising the New Right’s literature and roadmap. Dugin’s manifestos Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-EurasianismArctogeaThe Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia & The Great Awakening vs the Great Reset. Along with the New Right’s manifestos including Benoist’s Manifesto for a European Renaissance, Faye’s Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Resistance and Generation Identity A Declaration of War Against the ‘68ers. Are all war cries to mobilise radical extremists to commit political violence and terrorism against the liberal world order, postmodern world and whoever disagrees with them being designated as opposition. Nuance security and counter terrorism strategies and policies can be adopted to combat this unique radial extremism.

There is much that can be done to ensure solidarity, unity and security among communities combating radical extremism. Adopting a counter terrorism security strategy of a prevention-based model addressing the root causes of terrorism. An in-depth understanding of how threats develop further into violent attacks based on pre-attack behaviours. How has an individual become radicalised and what is the probability of them committing a terrorist attack? The community should be involved in this process and evaluation and not alienated (Gerspacher 2020; Battersby 2020). Also, anti-terrorism laws should be reformed to be more transparent, fair and equal for all demographics not alienating certain minorities (Dagistanli & Poynting 2017). The war criminals responsible for the devastation of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya that has caused the refugee crisis and further radical extremism abroad should be held accountable (Paul 2021). Nations should cooperate together to combat extremism and terrorism instead of utilizing it as a geopolitical opportunity to serve their bureaucratic interests. Evgenii Lobachev a retired FSB (Russia’s Federal Security Service) General-Major believed ISIS was created by the US to destabilize the Arab world and nations that oppose the US (Shlapentokh 2019; Kelly 2020). Nations building trust and cooperating to diminish extremism and terrorism is in the interest of all nations that want security, stability and prosperity (Pradt 2020). The War on Terror policies need to be reformed to actually prevent terrorism not serve political ends (Bar-On & Goldstein 2005). A thorough evaluation of how Russian Eurasianism should be developed and utilised within international relations and security should be proposed (Lukin & Novikov 2021; Vinkovetsky 2000; Shnirelman 2001; Rangimaporn 2006). Community and cultural development should be a part of security policy to provide a sense of belonging for all demographics within society (Pereira 1997; Atran 2011). Charles Upton who is a staunch critic of Dugin has developed and promoted along with his friend Dr. John Andrew Morrow the Covenants Initiative. With this initiative Muslims and Christians will protect and defend each other in accordance with their religious teachings and principles against extremism (Morrow 2013). Citizens, governments and security agencies can revaluate the approaches of counter terrorism serving the public interest for security, stability and prosperity.


Richards, Imogen 2019. A Philosophical and Historical Analysis of “Generation Identity”: Fascism, Online Media, and the European New Right. Pp 2. 7–9. 11–15. Terrorism and Political Violence. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. Criminology Department, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia.

Bar-On, Tamir 2008. Fascism to the Nouvelle Droite: The Dream of Pan-European Empire. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. 16:3. 327–345. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Bar-On, Tamir 2001. The Ambiguities of the Nouvelle Droite, 1968–1999. The European Legacy. 6:3. 333–351. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Nissen, Anita 2020. Chapter 6 The Trans-European Mobilization of “Generation Identity”: Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare and Migration in Europe. Pp 85–100. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer. UK

Schelkshorn, Hans 2018. The Ideology of the New Right and Religious Conservation. Towards an Ethical Critique of the New Politics of Authoritarianism. Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation in Contemporary Society. Pp 124–141. Volume 4: Issue 2. Brill. Schoningh.

Bar-On, Tamir 2021. The Alt-Right’s continuation of the ‘cultural war’ in Euro-American societies. Vol. 163 (1) pp 43–70. Sage Publications. Tecnologico de Monterrey, Mexico.

Upton, Charles 2018. Dugin Against Dugin: A Traditionalist Critique of the Fourth Political Theory. Introduction: Report from Atlantis: Dugin’s Geopolitical Vision pp 14–16. Dugin’s Eschatological Vision 16–23. A Question of Allegiances 23–31. Chapter 1: Gog and Magog vs. The Covenants of the Prophet, A Consideration of the Geopolitics of Alexander Dugin in Light of the Cosmology of Rene Guenon: The Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad 68–74. Chapter 2: Inverted Metaphysics: Part One: Critique of “The Metaphysics of Choas” from the Fourth Political Theory 78. Dugin’s Doctrine of the Primacy of Choas over Logos 95–96. Can Chaos be the Foundation of a New Social System? 128–130. A True Metaphysics Behind Dugin’s Chaos? 133. Dugin’s Biggest Contradiction 138. Chapter 3: Vectors of Duginism: Dugin and Crowley; Postmodernism as Magick; Mimicry as Technique. Chapter 4: Critique of The Fourth Political Theory, Part 1 183. Chapter 5: Critique of The Fourth Political Theory, Part 2 258. Chapter 6: Critique of The Rise of the Fourth Political Theory 342. Chapter 7: Principles of Sacred Activism 398: Part Three: Sacred Activism, United Front Ecumenism and the attack on Religion 448: Dugin and Jihadism; Dugin and Sufism 454. Chapter 8: Parousia and the Laws of Apocalypse 474: The Apocalypse of Tradition vs The Apocalupse of Dugin 477–482. Reviviscimus. USA.

Dugin Deconstructed 1: A Challenge to Alexander Dugin:

Dugin Deconstructed 2: Inverted Metaphysics 5 Contradictions:

Dugin Deconstructed 3: Dugin against Islam:

Dugin Deconstructed 4: Soul of Dugin, Soul of Russia:

An Open Letter to Steve Bannon by an American Muslim and Follower of Rene Guenon:

Charles Upton: Fifteen questions for Aleksandr Dugin.

Kipp, Jacob W 2002. Alexander Dugin and the ideology of national revival: Geopolitics, Eurasianism and the conservative revolution. European Security, 11:3, 91–125. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. London.

Backman, Jussi 2020. Contestations of Liberal Order: The West in Crisis? Chapter 11 A Russian Radical Conservative Challenge to the Liberal Global Order: Alexander Dugin. Pp 289–314. Palgrave Macmillan. UK.

Tydlitatova, Vera. Eurasia Quasi-Religious Myth of Alexander Dugin. Czech Republic.

Sedgwick, Mark 2012. The New Age of Russia: Occult and Esoteric Dimensions. Part 3 The Occult Revival in Late and Post-Soviet Russia (1985 to the Present): Occult Dissident Culture: The Case of Alexander Dugin. Pp 273–293. Studies on Language and Culture in Central and Eastern Europe. Volume 17. Germany.

Tolstoy, Audrey & McCaffray, Edmund 2015. Mind Games: Alexander Dugin and Russia’s War of Ideas. World Affairs. Vol 177, No 6. Pp 25–30. Sage Publications. JSTOR.

Shekhovtsov, Anton 2009. Alexander Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right. Religion Compass 3/4. 697–716. Pp 698. Sevastopol National Technical University. Journal Compilation. Blackwell Publishing.

Clowes, Edith W. 2011. Russian on the Edge: Imagined Geographies and Post-Soviet Identity. Chapter 2 Postmodernist Empire Meets Holy Rus’ How Alexander Dugin Tried to Change the Eurasian Periphery into the Sacred Center of the World. 43–67. Pp 43, 49, 65. Cornell University Press. Ithaca & London.

Drake, Richard 1988. Julius Evola, Radical Fascism and the Lateran Accords. Vol 74, №3 403–419. Pp 413–414. The Catholic Historical Review. Catholic University of America Press. JSTOR.

Hakl, Hans Thmas 2012. Julius Evola and the UR Group. Volume 12. Issue 1. Pp 53–90. Brill

Dugin, Alexander 1995. The magic disillusion of a Nationalist Intellectual: Alexander Dugin answers questions from his readers. 5. So, Fascist or non-Fascist? The Fourth Political Theory. (Dugin views Occultism apart of Traditionalism which it is not. For more information on this please read Charles Upton’s book The System of Antichrist: Truth and Falsehood in Postmodernism and the New Age and Chapter 3: Vectors of Duginism: Dugin and Crowley; Postmodernism as Magick; Mimicry as Technique.)

Laruelle, Marlene 2015. The Iuzhinskii Circle: Far-Right Metaphysics in the Soviet Underground and its Legacy Today. Vol.74 Issue 4 pp 563–580. The Russian Review.

Noordenbos, Boris 2011. Ironic imperialism: how Russian patriots are reclaiming postmodernism. Stud East Eur Thought. 63:147–158. University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.

Noordenbos, Boris 2016. Post-Soviet Literature and the Search for a Russian Identity. Chapter 7 Interpreting Gorbachev’s Birthmark: Conspiratorial Visions of Russian Identity. 173–199. Palgrave Macmillan. US.

Shnirelman, Victor 2019. Handbook of Conspiracy Theory and Contemporary Religion. Chapter 20 Alexander Dugin: Between Eschatology, Esotericism and Conspiracy Theory. 443–460. Pp 446–453. Brill.

Luks, Leonid 2009. A “Third Way”-or Back to the Third Reich? Russian Politics & Law. 47:1. 7–23. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Bar-On, Tamir 2009. Understanding Political Conversion and Mimetic Rivalry. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions. 10:3–4. 241–264. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Dugin, Alexander 2014. Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism. The Manifesto of the Global Revolutionary Alliance pp 99–126. On “White Nationalism” and Other Potential Allies in the Global Revolution pp 127–131. If You are in Favour of Global Liberal Hegemony, you are the Enemy pp 132–137. Arktos.

Bar-On, Tamir 2013. Rethinking the French New Right: Alternative to Modernity. Chapter 8 Three key messengers. Pp 184–211. Pp 188, 196. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy Ser. Taylor & Francis Group.

Laqueur, Walter 1993. Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia. Part Three: Villains Galore — The Postcommunist Age Chapter 11 The Ideology of the New Right Pp 140–142, 146–147, 174. Part Four: The Struggle for Power, 1987- Chapter 12 Tsars and Cossacks 191–192. Conclusion 291. Harper Collins Publishers. America, New York.

Piveronus, Jr., Peter J 2009. Reinventing Russia: The Formation of a Post-Soviet Identity. Chapter 4: Eurasianism: The Mackinder Thesis Revisited pp 33–45. Chapter 5: The New (Moscow) Consensus pp 45–55. Chapter 6: New Russia-New Identity pp 55–61. University Press of America. Lanham. Boulder. New York. Toronto. Plymouth, UK.

Peunova, Marina 2008. An Eastern Incarnation of the European New Right: Aleksandr Panarin and New Eurasianist Discourse in Contemporary Russia. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. 16:3. 407–419. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Sokolov, Mikhail 2009. New Right-Wing Intellectuals in Russia: Strategies of Legitimization. Russian Politics & Law. 47:1. 47–75. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Shekhovtsov, Anton 2008. The Palingenetic Thrust of Russian Neo-Eurasianism: Ideas of Rebirth in Aleksandr Dugin’s Worldview. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions. 9:4. 491–506. Pp 503. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Dugin, Alexander 2000. On the implementation of the Eurasian Project and National Liberalism. Dugin on Thursday, October 12, 2000–11:59.

Arctogei Manifesto

Enstad, Johannes Due 2017. “Glory to Breivik!”: The Russian Far Right and the 2011 Norway Attacks. Terrorism and Political Violence. 29:5. 773–792. Pp 775. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Moses, A. Dirk 2019. “White Genocide” and the Ethics of Public Analysis. Journal of Genocide Research. 21:2. 201–213. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Sellner, Martin 2021. The strategy of the collection. Sezession.

Baele, Stephane J., Brace, Lewys & Coan, Travis G. 2020. The ‘tarrant effect’: what impact did far-right attacks have on the 8chan forum? Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

The USA and The New World Order: A Debate Between Olavo de Carvalho and Aleksandr Dugin. 2012. The Inter-American Institute for Philosophy, Government and Social Thought. Pp 82, 158.

New Resistance. 2019. Reply to Olavo de Carvalho: Was the terrorist Brenton Tarrant Eurasianist?

Shlapentokh, Dmitry V. 1997. Eurasianism: Past and Present. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol 30. No 2. 129–151. Pergamon. University of California. UK.

Smirnov, Andrey V. 2020. Classical Eurasianism as Post-Revolutionary Philosophy. Russian Studies in Philosophy. 58:6. 522–534. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Smirnov, Nikolay 2019. Left-Wing Eurasianism and Postcolonial Theory. e-flux journal 97.

The Point with Liu Xin: China, Russia ‘struggling Western hegemony’. CGTN. (Go to 10:00 and go to 8:19 for full context.)

Engstrom, Maria 2014. Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy. Contemporary Security Policy. 35:3. 356–379. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Kushnir, Ostap 2019. Messianic Narrations in Contemporary Russian Statecraft and Foreign Policy. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies. Vol 13. No 1. 37–60. CEJISS.

Prozorov, Sergei 2012. The Katechon in the age of biopolitical nihilism. Cont Philos Rev. 45:483–503. Springer. Finland.

Hell, Julia 2009. Katechon: Carl Schmitt’s Imperial Theology and the Ruins of the Future. The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory. 84:4. 283–326. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Bell, Sinclair W. & du Plessis, Paul J. 2020. Russia’s New Authoritarianism: Putin and the Politics of Order. Russia as Contemporary Katechon. Pp 200–206. Edinburgh Univeristy Press.

Dugin, Alexander 1997. The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia. Chapter 5 Geopolitics of European “new right”. Pp 80. 5.4 The Eurasian Empire of the End. Jean Parvulesco. Pp 84. 5.6 Russian + Islam = European rescue. Carlo Terrachano. Pp 86–88. Chapter 6 Neo-eurasism: 6.1 The Eurasian passionarnost Lev Gumilyov. Pp 88–90. 6.2 New Russian Eurasians. Pp 90–92. 6.3 Towards a new bipolarity. Pp 92–94. 3.6 Towards a new Eurasian empire. Pp 120–123. 5.2 Russian nationalism. Ethnic demography and Empire. Pp 144–147. 4.7 The Fall of China. Pp 205–207. Gulf War — a war against Europe. Pp 416–420.

Dugin, Alexander 2018. Ethnos and Society. Arktos.

Dugin, Alexander 2019. Ethnosociology: The Foundations. Arktos.

Shnirelman, Viktor & Panarin, Sergei 2001. Lev Gumilev: His Pretensions as Founder of Ethnology and his Eurasian Theories. Inner Asia 3. 1–18. Brill. Russia.

Bassin, Mark & Suny, Ronald Grigor 2016. The Gumileav Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism and the Construction in Modern Russia. Chapter 9 Biopolitics and the Ubiquity of Ethnicity. Culture and Society after Socialism. Pp 244–272. Cornell University Press.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2007. Dugin Eurasianism: a window on the minds of the Russian elite or an intellectual ploy? Stud East Eur Thought. 59:215–236. Springer. USA.

Tsygankov, A.P. 2003. Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after the Soviet break-up. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol.36. No 1. Pp 101–127. Pergamon. JSTOR. University of California Press. USA.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2017. Alexander Dugin’s Views of Russian history: collapse and revival. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. 25:3. 331–343. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Sharpe, Matthew 2020. In the Crosshairs of the Fourfold: Critical Thoughts on Aleksandr Dugin’s Heidegger. Critical Horizons. A journal of Philosophy and Social Theory. 21:2. 167–187. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Ingram, Alan 2001. Alexander Dugin: geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia. Political Geography. 20. 1029–1051. Pergamon.

Curanovic, Alicja Cecylia 2010. Relations Between the Orthodox Church and Islam in the Russian Federation. Journal of Church and State. Vol 52. No 3. Pp 503–539. Oxford University Press.

Heiser, James D. 2014. “The American Empire Should Be Destroyed”: Aleksander Dugin and the Perils of Immanentized Eschatology. Pp 88–97. Repristination Press. USA.

Hollwerth, Alexander, Umland, Andreas & Uffelmann, Dirk (2007(2012)). The sacred Eurasian empire of Aleksandr Dugin. A Discourse Analysis on Poat-Soviet Russian Right-Wing Extremism. (German: Das sakrale eurasische Imperium des Aleksandr Dugin. Eine Diskursanalyse Zum postsowjetischen Russischen Rechtsextremismus). Dugin’s axis thinking as an expression of Eurasian world power thinking. Pp 296–315. Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society. Vol. 59. Ibidem.

Dreher, Sabine 2020. Religions in International Political Economy Chapter 5 Toward Multipolarity Through Religious Nationalism? Pp 101–127. Palgrave Macmillan. UK.

Merati, Simona E. 2017. Muslims in Putin’s Russia: Discourse on Identity, Politics and Security. Chapter 7 The Role of Islam in Russia’s Geopolitical Vision. Pp 163–195. Palgrave Macmillan. UK.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2008. Alexander Dugin’s Views on the Middle East. Space and Polity. 12:2. 251–268. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2008. Islam and Orthodox Russia: From Eurasianism to Islamism. Communist and Post-Communist Studies. Vol 41. No 1. Pp 27–46. Pp 32, 39, 40–45. University of California Press. JSTOR. USA.

Michael, George 2019. Useful Idiots or Fellow Travelers? The Relationship between the American Far Right and Russia. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol 31. No 1. 64–83. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Laruelle, Marlene 2020. Mirro Games? Ideological Resonances between Russian and US Radical Conservatism. Contemporary Russian Conservatism: Problems, Paradoxes and Perspectives. Eurasian Studies Library. Vol 13. Pp 177–204. Brill.

Hell, Julia & Steinmetz, George 2017. A period of “wild and fierce fanaticism”: Populism, theo-poltical militarism and the crisis of US hegemony. American Journal of Cultural Sociology. Vol 5. No 3. 373–391. Palgrave Macmillan. USA.

Teitelbaum, Benjamin R. 2020. War for Eternity: The Return of Traditionalism and the Rise of the Populist Right. Pp 26–27, 95, 160–161. Penguin.

McCulloch, Tom 2006. The Nouvelle Droite in the 1980s and 1990s: Ideology and Entryism, the Relationship with the Front National. French Politics. 4. 158–178. Palgrave Macmillan.

Eltchaninoff, Michel 2017. Inside the Mind of Marine Le Pen. Pp 74–75. Hurst. Oxford University Press.

Bergmann, Eirikur 2018. Conspiracy & Populism: The Politics of Misinformation. Palgrave Macmillan.

Garaev, Danis 2017. Jihad as Passionarity: Said Buriatskii and Lev Gumilev. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. 28:2. 203–218. Pp 213. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Garaev, Danis 2021. “Methodology of the ‘Russian World’ and ‘Russian Islam’: New Ideologies of the Post-Socialist Context”. The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review. 1–24. Pp 10. Brill.

Dugin, Alexander 2009. We are not going to install boundaries: Eurasianism as a prophetic school manipulates with eternity. Arctogea.

Arnold, Jafe 2019. Mysteries of Eurasia: The Esoteric Sources of Alexander Dugin and the Yuzhinsky Circle. Research Masters Degree in Theology and Religious Studies/Western Esotericism. Center for the History of Hermetic Philosophy and Related Currents.

Oskanian, Kevork 2021. Russian Exceptionalism between East and West. Chapter 6 Looking East, Looking West. Pp 197–240. Palgrave Macmillan. UK.

Salami, Iwa 2018. Terrorism Financing with Virtual Currencies: Can Regulatory Technology Solutions Combat This? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 41:12. 968–989. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Warreth, Shahed 2019. Crowdfunding and Cryptocurrency Use by Far-Right and Jihadi Groups. Vox Pol.

Kfir, Isaac 2020. Cryptocurrencies, national security, crime and terrorism. Comparative Strategy. Vol 39. No 2. 113–127. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Ahmed, Reem & Pisoiu, Daniela 2021. Uniting the far right: how the far-right extremist, New Right and populist frames overlap on Twitter — a German case study. European Societies. Vol 23. No 2. 232–254. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Maly, Ico 2019. New Right Metapolitics and the Algorithmic Activism of Schild & Vrienden. Social Media + Society. 1–15. Sage.

Rauchfleisch, Adrian & Kaiser, Jonas 2020. The German Far-right on YouTube: An Analysis of User Overlap and User Comments. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media. Vol 64. No 3. 373–396. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Valencia-Garcia, Louie Dean 2020. Far-Right Revisionism and the End of History: Alt/Histories. Chapter 16 The Rise and Fall of the Far Right in the Digital Age. Pp 305–345. Routledge Approaches to History Ser. Taylor & Francis Group.

Pokalova, Elena 2019. Driving Factors behind Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 42:9. 798–818. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Rudner, Martin 2017. “Electronic Jihad”: The Internet as Al Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 40:1. 10–23. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Pantucci, Raffaello & Ong, Kyler 2021. Persistence of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the West. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. Vol 13. No 1. Pp 118–126. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research. JSTOR.

Umland, Andreas 2016. Alexander Dugin and Moscow’s New Right Radical Intellectual Circles at the Start of Putin’s Third Presidential Term 2012–2013: The Anti-Orange Committee, The Izborsk Club and the Florian Geyer Club in their Political Context. Continuity and Change in European Governance. Vol 10. No 2. Europolity.

Sibgatullina, Gulnaz & Kemper, Michael 2017. Between Salafism and Eurasianism: Geidar Dzhemal and the Global Islamic Revolution in Russia. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. 28:2. 219–236. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Arnold, Jafe 2018. From Traditionalism and Sufism to “Islamic Radicalism”: The Peculiar Case of Geydar Dzhemal (1947–2016).

Discourse between Yaqub Zaki and Geydar Dzhemal. Political islam, neo-ottoman project, Russia, China.

The curious connection between Shedman and the Caliphate.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2010. Order from Geopolitical Choas: “Big Strategy” of Russia.

Buckingham, Louisa & Alali, Nusiebah 2020. Extreme parallels: a corpus-driven analysis of ISIS and far-right discourse. Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online. 15:2. 310–331. Routledge. Taylor & Francis Group.

Bar-On, Tamir 2018. ‘Islamofascism’: Four Competing Discourses on the Islamism-Fascism Comparison. Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies. Vol 7. 241–274. Brill.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2010. The Rise of the Russian Khalifat: The View from the Jihadist Side. Iran and the Caucasus. Vol 14. No 1. Pp 117–142. JSTOR. Brill.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2011. Jihadism in the Post-Soviet Era: The Case of Interaction of Theoretical and Practical Aspects of the Revolutionary Struggle. Iran and the Caucasus. Vol 15. 275–298. Brill.

Dzhemal, Geydar 1997. Peace is on Fire; The Islamic Project is in Danger!

Dzhemal, Geydar 2006. Costs of Imperial Federalism.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2008. Georgian-Ossetian-Russian Conflict from the point of View of Muslims.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2012. Trap for Eurasia.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2012. Geydar Dzhemal: “The Afghan People are Breaking the Teeth of an Imperialist Aggressor Before Our Eyes!”.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2013. “Traps for Muslims” and how to get out of them.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2015. 2015.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2015. Why Can’t Iran and Russia Be Partners in Real Life?

Dzhemal, Geydar 2007. “Walking Between” Mediterranean, Canpian and Arabian.

Dzheml, Geydar 2010. Leave To Stay.

Shekhovtsov, Anton & Umland Andreas 2009. Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionlist? “Neo-Eurasiansim” and Perennial Philosophy. The Russian Review. 68. 662–78.

Fenghi, Fabrizio 2020. It Will Be Fun and Terrifying: Nationalism and Protest in Post-Soviet Russia. Pp 204. Faculty Development Fund & Humanities Research Fund, Brown University. The University of Wisconsin Press.

Abdulmajid, Adib 2021. Extremism in the Digital Era: The Media Discourse of Terrorist Groups in the Middle East. Chapter 7 Radical Islamists in the Digital Era: A Multifacet Extremist Discourse. Pp. 169–246. Palgrave Macmillan.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2005. Geydar Dzhemal’s Intellectual Jihad.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2013. “The EU will last for a maximum of 10 more years…”.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2016. The end of Europe as a civilizational criterion.

Dzhemal, Geydar 2009. Europe twitches with elbows connected by an American rope.

Tausch, Arno 2021. Directions in International Terrorism: Theories, Trends and Trajectories. Chapter 13 Islamist Terrorism, Political Islam and Migration in Western Europe. Pp 289-334. Palgrave Macmillan.

Rangsimaporn, Paradorn 2009. Russia as an Aspiring Great Power in East Asia: Perceptions and Policies from Yeltsin to Putin. Chapter 4 The Many Faces of Eurasianism. 4.2 Geopolitics and the Neo-Eurasianist movement. Pp 49–53. Palgrave Macmillan. UK.

Znamenski, Andrei 2011. Red Shambhala: Magic, Prophecy and Geoplitics in the Heart of Asia. Theosophical Publishing House. Quest Books.

Steinmetz, Kevin F., Knight, Trina & McCarthy, Adrienne L. 2021. Organizational Characteristic Associated with Vulnerability to Social Engineering Deception: A Qualitative Analysis. Victims & Offenders. Pp 1–18. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Steinmetz, Kevin F. 2021. The Identification of a Model Victim for Social Engineering: A Qualitative Analysis. Victims & Offenders. Vol 16. No 4. 540–564. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Azmanova, Albena & Dakwar, Azar 2019. The inverted postnational constellation Identitarian populism in context. Eur Law J. 25:494–501. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Wiley.

Paul, Erik 2020. Australia in the Expanding Global Crisis: The Geopolitics of Racism. Chapter 2 Racism as Nationalism and Capitalism. Pp 27–81. Palgrave Macmillan.

Paul, Erik 2021. Australian Imperialism: The Geopolitical State. Chapter 3 Human Nature, Global War and Justice. Pp 97–140. Palgrave Macmillan.

Battersby, John 2020. Security sector practitioner perceptions of the terror threat environment before the Christchurch attacks. Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online. 15:2. 295–309. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Gerspacher, Nadia 2020. Law, Security and the State of Perpetual Emergency. Chapter 8 A Different Kind of New Normal: An Alternative Approach to Policing Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Pp 185–205. Palgrave Macmillan.

Dagistanli, Selda & Poynting, Scott 2017. The Palgrave Handbook of Australia and New Zealand Criminology, Crime and Justice. Chapter 22 Terrorism and Anti-terrorism Laws. Pp 331–345. Palgrave Macmillan.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2019. Online Terrorist Propaganda, Recruitment and Radicalization. Chapter 22 ISIS and Russia: The Use of Threat for Spreading of Influence and ISIS’s Future. Pp 351–368. 22.13 No Cooperation with the United States. Pp 364. 22.17 Summary. Pp 366. Taylor & Francis Group.

Kelly, Catherine Lena 2020. Law, Security and the State of Perpetual Emergency. Chapter 10 Legal and Political Responses to Terrorism: Comparing Democracies and Hybrid Regimes. Pp 235–265. Palgrave Macmillan.

Pradt, Tilman 2020. The Prequel to China’s New Silk Road: Preparing the Ground in Central Asia. Chapter 7 Security Cooperation Among SCO Members. Pp 87–99. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bar-On, Tamir & Goldstein, Howard 2005. Fighting Violence: A Critique of the War on Terrorism. International Politics. 42. 225–245. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lukin, Alexander & Novikov, Dmitry 2021. The Return of Eurasia: Continuity and Change. Chapter 2 Greater Eurasia: From Geopolitical Pole to International Society? Pp 33–78. Palgrave Macmillan.

Shnirelman, Viktor 2001. The Fate of Empires and Eurasian Federalism: A Discussion between the Eurasianists and their Opponents in the 1920s. Inner Asia 3. 153–73. Brill.

Vinkovetsky, Ilya 2000. Classical Eurasianism and Its Legacy. Canadian-American Slavic Studies. 34. No 2. 125–39. Brill.

Rangsimaporn, Paradorn 2006. Interpretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia’s role in East Asia. Europe-Asia Studies. 58:3. 371–389. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Pereira, Alexius 1997. The Revitalization of Eurasian Identity in Singapore. Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science. Vol 25. No 2. 7–24. Brill.

Atran, Scott 2011. The Ethics and Efficacy of the Global War on Terrorism: Fighting Terror with Terror. Who Becomes a Terrorist Today? Pp 45–58. Palgrave Macmillan.

Morrow, John Andrew 2013. The Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad with the Christians of the World. Angelico Press/Sophia Perennis.

Shlapentokh, Dmitry 2021. Ideological Seduction and Intellectuals in Putin’s Russia. Palgrave Macmillan.

Burckhardt, Titus 1987. Mirror of the Intellect: Essays on Traditional Science & Sacred Art by Titus Burckhardt. Translated and edited by William Stoddart. 1 Traditional Cosmology & The Modern World. 3. ‘Riding the Tiger’. Pp 68–74. New York Press.

Upton, Charles 2019. The World is Against Us but God is For Us.

Upton, Charles 2009. Findings in Metaphysic, Path, and Lore. With a Response to the Traditionalist/Perennialist School. Sophia Perennis.